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Abstract
Considerable evidence suggests that economic interdependence and integration reduce 
the likelihood of militarized conflict. However, scholars have devoted remarkably scant 
attention to testing different explanations of the liberal peace. This article offers an em-
pirical test that can help adjudicate the two main arguments on the liberal peace: the op-
portunity cost and signaling arguments. Under the incomplete information assumption, I 
derive different observable implications of the competing arguments regarding how tar-
get states respond when challenged. By estimating selection models comprising dispute 
initiation and reciprocation, I find that, as challengers are more dependent on bilateral 
trade, targets are less likely to reciprocate disputes, which is supportive of the signaling 
argument. Regarding dispute initiation, increases in foreign direct investment and financial 
openness are associated with a decrease in the probability of conflict initiation. Last, the 
pacifying effects of the liberal economic variables are much more pronounced in contigu-
ous and major dyads than in other dyads. 
Keywords: Economic interdependence, globalization, militarized disputes, opportunity 
costs, signaling  
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The effect of  economic integration and interdependence on interstate conflict 
has been a central question in political science for centuries. According to the lib-
eral peace literature, increased commerce reduces the likelihood of  interstate con-
flicts. The explanations of  the liberal peace can be grouped into two sets of  argu-
ments: the ‘‘opportunity cost’’ and ‘‘signaling’’ arguments, although other variants 
of  explanations abound.1 The basis of  the opportunity cost argument is that milita-
rized conflict diminishes interstate commerce. The fear of  lost gains from commerce 
discourages states from engaging in military disputes. On the other hand, the signal-
ing argument emphasizes that the opportunity costs of  fighting allow states to reveal 
information. Only resolute political leaders will engage in military dispute, forego-
ing potential gains from trade and foreign investment. Therefore, economically glo-
balized states can more credibly communicate their intentions and resolve with each 
other, reducing uncertainty and thus the likelihood of  conflict. 
An increasing number of  empirical studies have demonstrated the pacifying effects 
of  economic interdependence (e.g., Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Gartzke and Li 
2003; Gartzke 2007; Hegre, Oneal, and Russett 2010; Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 
2008; Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999). Yet, the existing literature has paid scant atten-
tion to differentiating the two arguments. Both arguments predict that increased eco-
nomic globalization and interdependence reduce the risk of  military conflict. There-
fore, the previous focus on conflict onset or initiation does not provide a critical test 
of  these two alternative theories. It is important to conduct such a test, given that sev-
eral scholars (e.g., Mansfield and Pollins 2001; Way, forthcoming) criticize the under-
specified causal mechanisms for the liberal peace and the poor match between the-
ory and method. We still do not know which causal mechanism is responsible for 
the empirical regularity that economically globalized or interdependent dyads have 
a lower propensity to experience militarized disputes. The lack of  empirical studies 
well suited to distinguishing the two theories will hinder the identification and devel-
opment of  the microfoundations underlying the liberal peace. 
To adjudicate competing explanations of  the same phenomenon, we should seek 
to derive different observable implications from each causal mechanism and test 
them against new evidence (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). To this end, I ap-
proach the opportunity cost argument using the incomplete information assump-
tion 2 and analyze how opportunity costs operate in a crisis bargaining situation. 
This implies that I examine and compare the two competing arguments under the 
informational theory of  war. This strategy, building on Schultz (1999), who differ-
entiates and tests two theories of  the democratic peace, allows me to logically de-
rive different observable implications of  a credibility of  a challenger’s threat and 
the corresponding target’s response to that threat. When threatened militarily by 
an opponent, a state must evaluate the other’s resolve or power to fight. If  the op-
portunity cost argument is correct, then challengers that are more integrated into 
the global economy, or are more dependent on trade with another country, will 
be more likely to face reciprocation by targets.3 Economically globalized or inter-
dependent  states are constrained from using force because of  the high economic 
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costs. Therefore, target states will doubt that the challengers will carry through on 
their threats. To the contrary, the signaling argument suggests that targets will be 
less likely to reciprocate threats issued by economically globalized or interdepen-
dent challengers. This is because economic globalization and interdependence en-
able challengers to send costly signals to their targets. I test these different empiri-
cal implications. 
This article also seeks to investigate whether economic integration and interde-
pendence have the same effect on conflict at both stages of  a dispute: initiation and 
escalation. For instance, economic interdependence may fail to deter the initiation 
of  disputes but may succeed in discouraging the escalation of  those disputes. To ex-
amine this possibility, I look at both stages of  disputes. If  either theory accurately 
explains dispute initiation, we should observe that a greater degree of  economic in-
tegration and interdependence reduces the propensity of  a state to initiate a milita-
rized dispute. 
I perform empirical tests using a sample of  all the directed dyads from 1950 to 
2000. By estimating selection models, I examine how the degree of  economic inter-
dependence and openness to the world economy—bilateral, total trade, foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) dependence, and government financial openness— affects the 
probability of  conflict initiation and reciprocation. To preview the conclusion, the es-
timation results on reciprocation lend more support to the signaling argument, indi-
cating that when challengers are more dependent on bilateral trade with their targets, 
challenges are less likely to be reciprocated by targets. This finding can be interpreted 
as evidence supporting the signaling explanation that economic openness serves as a 
medium for information exchange. With respect to dispute initiation, initiators’ gov-
ernment financial openness and FDI dependence are found to reduce the likelihood 
of  conflict initiation.4 Considering that both the probabilities of  conflict initiation 
and escalation constitute the probability of  conflict onset, these findings show that 
different liberal economic variables affect the risk of  military conflict through differ-
ent channels. I also find that the pacifying effects of  economic interdependence and 
globalization are much more pronounced among contiguous and major power dyads 
than among noncontiguous and nonmajor power dyads. 
The rest of  the article is organized as follows. First, I begin with a brief  review of  
the two arguments. In the following section, I propose a test to discriminate between 
the two arguments. Next, I present a series of  empirical tests regarding conflict initia-
tion and reciprocation. The final section concludes with a brief  suggestion for future 
research. 
Theoretical Discussion 
The main point of  the opportunity cost argument is that economic interdependence 
discourages states from engaging in militarized disputes by increasing costs for  fighting 
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(e.g., Gasiorowski 1986; Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999; Polachek 1980). According to 
the standard trade theory, international trade allows states to specialize in production 
of  goods and services that they produce most efficiently. This specialization and ex-
change based on comparative advantage increases national wealth. Military conflict in-
terferes with this efficiency-enhancing process by endangering an importer’s supply of  
needed goods and services or by making it difficult to export goods to the best trade 
partner (Oneal and Russett 1997, 270). As long as militarized disputes disrupt trade, in-
ternational trade increases the opportunity costs of  fighting. In short, trade reduces the 
expected utility of  conflict, inducing states to prefer a peaceful solution. 
This logic is not restricted to economic interdependence. States’ exposure to the 
global market constrains them from engaging in military conflict insofar as economic 
agents react adversely to conflict. Conflict would affect not only bilateral trade be-
tween belligerents but also trade between belligerent and neutral countries (Dorussen 
and Ward 2010; Glick and Taylor 2010; Maoz 2009). Disruption of  trade with third-
party countries further constrains the use of  force. Therefore, the level of  total trade, 
as well as that of  bilateral trade, would be influential in decisions to engage in milita-
rized disputes. The same can be said of  FDI and foreign indirect investment. Military 
conflict increases the risk that foreign investment will be expropriated, destroyed, or 
discouraged. Accordingly, foreign investment increases the opportunity costs of  con-
flict, as does trade. Moreover, as Polachek, Seiglie, and Xiang (2007, 281) note, FDI 
may reduce conflict more than will trade, since FDI involves some assets that can-
not be moved without considerable loss, thereby being ex post immobile. Once a mul-
tinational firm undertakes an FDI, the investment becomes much more illiquid ex 
post while relatively liquid ex ante (Jensen 2003, 594). Consequently, ‘‘the loss result-
ing from interstate conflict can continue for a long time with the cost not being recov-
ered’’ (Polachek, Seiglie, and Xiang 2007, 282). In line with this argument, several 
studies (e.g., Souva and Prins 2006; Polachek, Seiglie, and Xiang 2007) find that FDI 
decreases the risk of  military conflict. 
Therefore, economic interdependence and integration foster domestic interests 
that prefer peace to conflict. In turn, these domestic interests provide leaders with 
incentives to avoid costly conflicts in favor of  maintaining commercial ties and en-
hancing aggregate economic gains. ‘‘Fearful of  the domestic political consequences 
of  losing the benefits of  trade,’’ Oneal and Russett (1999, 4-5) write, ‘‘policymakers 
avoid the use of  force against states with which they engage in economically impor-
tant trade.’’ Greater dependence on the global economy implies more constraints on 
using force. Therefore, dyads with higher levels of  trade are discouraged from fighting 
and resolve their difference more peacefully than dyads with lower ones. 
However, Morrow (1999) criticizes the opportunity cost argument, pointing out 
that the effect of  the increased cost for fighting a war is not determinate. Trade has 
two countervailing effects on the likelihood of  conflict. First, the possible loss of  
trade increases the cost of  war and thus leads a state to be more willing to make 
concessions. At the same time, however, the other state may issue a threat or raise 
898     K i m  i n  J o u r n a l  o f  C o n f l i C t  r e s o l u t i o n  58  (2013)
greater demands because it knows the opponent is willing to make more conces-
sions. Accordingly, the effect of  trade on conflict is not clear and depends on which 
effect dominates. This theoretical problem arises because the opportunity cost argu-
ment relies on decision-theoretic accounts, focusing on the decision calculus of  a sin-
gle state without regard to the actions of  other states (Way, forthcoming; McDonald 
2009)5. That explanation also treats conflict and peace as two distinct phenomena. As 
Schelling (1981, 5) succinctly states, however, ‘‘most conflict situations are essentially 
bargaining situations.’’ War occurs as a result of  strategic interactions between two 
states in which each state formulates strategy, taking into account the other state’s re-
action and seek to change the other’s perceptions of  its intentions. Without consider-
ing these strategic interactions, we cannot fully explain the effect of  trade on conflict. 
The signaling argument departs from the opportunity cost argument in that it is 
embedded in the bargaining theory of  war. The well-known bargaining theory of  war 
explains war as a result of  bargaining failure, which is attributable to uncertainty and 
commitment problem (Fearon 1995).6 States possess private information about their 
resolve, their willingness to fight rather than make concessions, and power.7 Given in-
formational asymmetry, states have incentives to exaggerate their own resolve and to 
discount opponents’ signals. This makes a settlement more difficult. Consequently, a 
reliable communication is necessary to avoid crisis escalation and to facilitate more 
efficient bargaining outcomes. 
How does a state convince an adversary that it is resolute? Costly signals pro-
vide a mechanism to credibly communicate. Because only a resolute state is willing 
to pay the cost of  signaling, for instance, costly signals provide an opportunity for 
opponents to reassess the resolve of  the other state. The signaling argument for the 
liberal peace suggests that economic interdependence and globalization can gener-
ate a credible signal (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Gartzke and Li 2003; Mor-
row 1999; Reed 2003a). The argument views economic interdependence as an infor-
mational medium allowing states to reveal information about their resolve. Consider 
a political leader of  a state that is highly integrated into the global economy. A threat 
to use force will frighten economic actors. In response to the increased risk of  a mili-
tarized dispute, traders are likely to seek alternative markets or suppliers, and interna-
tional investors may reallocate their capital to other countries or charge a higher risk 
premium, insofar as they believe the threat is genuine. As a state becomes more inte-
grated into the global economy, economic actors are more able to respond to politi-
cal risk and thus the state faces greater costs in pursuing conflict. If  a state initiates a 
conflict despite the likelihood of  such negative reactions, the state can credibly dem-
onstrate its willingness to fight. An irresolute state would not forego gains from trade 
or foreign investment by issuing such a challenge. This separation of  types allows the 
opponent to update its perception of  the challenger’s resolve to fight. Hence, greater 
economic interdependence and globalization give states more options to reveal infor-
mation about intention and resolve, allowing them to communicate more efficiently 
with one another.8  
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Testing Two Competing Explanations 
No study to date has sought to test the validity of  the two explanations. Most ex-
tant research studies examine the hypothesis that an increased level of  dyadic trade 
makes militarized disputes less likely to occur (e.g., Barbieri 2002; Hegre, Oneal, and 
Russett 2010; Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny 2004; Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008; 
Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999). This method, however, does not differentiate between 
the opportunity cost and signaling perspectives, since both theories predict that trade 
dependence lowers the risk of  disputes. Even the proponents of  the costly signaling 
argument (e.g., Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Gartzke and Li 2003) have tested 
the same hypothesis.9 Moving away from the existing tendency to focus on bilateral 
trade, for example, Gartzke and Li (2003) explore the role of  openness to capital mar-
ket and FDI in deterring militarized interstate dispute (MID) onset to test the signal-
ing explanation. Yet, they do not consider that the opportunity cost argument can 
also explain the deterrent role of  capital market and FDI. Accordingly, we still do not 
know which causal mechanism is responsible for the empirical finding, or whether 
both mechanisms simultaneously operate or not, although considerable evidence has 
lent support to the pacifying effects of  economic openness.10 
Some studies (Gelpi and Grieco 2008; Hegre 2004) instead focus on dispute initi-
ation by distinguishing initiators and targets.11 This strategy allows them to directly 
test one empirical implication derived from the opportunity cost argument that a state 
more dependent on trade with another state is less likely to initiate a dispute against 
that state. Many studies use the weak link measurement strategy that measures the 
level of  economic interdependence in a dyad with the trade dependence of  the less 
dependent country in a dyad. Hence, ‘‘if  a military conflict occurs within a dyad, 
we cannot be sure if  it was in fact the ‘less constrained’ state that initiated the dis-
pute’’ (Gelpi and Grieco 2008, 19). Yet, the examination of  conflict initiation is still 
ill equipped to test the opportunity cost argument against the alternative signaling 
argument because empirical implications regarding conflict initiation drawn from 
both arguments are observationally equivalent. Gartzke and Li (2003, 570) write that 
‘‘leaders who anticipate negative economic consequences of  hostile political words 
are aware that their talk is no longer cheap. Bluffing is less frequent as the cost in-
volved in scaring markets deters leaders from idle threats.’’ 
To adjudicate competing explanations of  a single phenomenon, we should derive 
additional hypotheses from each explanation and see how evidence stacks up against 
the new competing expectations (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). If  one of  the com-
peting explanations can explain additional evidence, it should be judged superior be-
cause of  its scope (Gelpi and Griesdorf  2001). Accordingly, a better theory of  the lib-
eral peace will be able to explain states’ behavior at the stage of  conflict escalation, in 
addition to the stage of  conflict initiation. 
I derive different observable implications regarding conflict reciprocation, building 
on the literature on audience costs. Fearon (1994) argues that leaders would suffer do-
mestic audience costs if  they issued threats and failed to follow through.  The threat of  
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this possible punishment discourages democratic leaders from making empty threats, 
making democracies’ threats more informative. Thus, threats issued by democracies 
will, on average, be more effective than threats by nondemocracies. To test the hypoth-
esis, several scholars (Schultz 1999; Prins 2003; Weeks 2008) investigate the relation-
ship between the type of  regime and crisis behavior. For example, Schultz (1999) and 
his follow-up studies (Prins 2003; Weeks 2008) have examined how target states react 
when challenged by democracies. They suggest that if  democracies are systematically 
more able to make credible threats, they will face lower rates of  resistance. 
In particular, Schultz (1999) uses this reasoning to differentiate two institutional 
theories for the democratic peace: the institutional constraints and the informational 
arguments. Schultz argues that if  the institutional constraints argument holds true, tar-
gets challenged by democracies are more likely to resist. This is because democratic 
leaders face higher political costs for using force and targets will not believe the threat 
will be carried out. According to the information argument, the democratic initiators 
are more able to reveal their resolve and the targets are less inclined to resist the threat. 
I apply this logic directly to the two arguments on the liberal peace. Polachek 
and Xiang (2010) show that the opportunity cost argument can explain the pacify-
ing effect of  trade even under the incomplete information assumption. They con-
clude that it is not necessary to rely on the signaling argument to explain why trade 
deters conflict (p. 140). This conclusion indicates that I can approach the two com-
peting arguments under the same assumption of  incomplete information. In addi-
tion, Polachek and Xiang show only how opportunity costs can decrease the equi-
librium probability of  war. Therefore, it is useful to discuss the role of  opportunity 
costs in crisis escalation. 
How do the two arguments then yield different predictions about the credibility of  
threats? It simply depends on the role of  signaling. If  the signaling argument is cor-
rect, target states should be less likely to resist the threat as challengers are more de-
pendent on the global economy or on bilateral trade with them. When threatened, 
targets must evaluate whether the threat is genuine before choosing to reciprocate or 
not, while challengers seek to manipulate the opponent’s perception of  their inten-
tions. Challengers with greater economic dependence on bilateral trade with their op-
ponent or in the global economy can more effectively and credibly reveal their resolve 
in a crisis. Since challengers’ degree of  economic dependence is readily observable 
and quantifiable (Gartzke and Li 2003), they can clearly display their resolve to fight 
and persuade their opponents to yield. 
In contrast, the opportunity cost argument does not consider the role of  costly sig-
naling. If  the opportunity cost argument holds true, therefore, target states should 
be more likely to resist threats from more globalized or interdependent challengers. 
Greater economic dependence of  initiators, on the target, and in general, implies that 
they will face greater economic and thus political costs in waging war. Therefore, 
challengers with more constraints are more willing to find peaceful alternatives as 
the crisis escalates. Their opponents are well aware of  that fact. Targets are thus more 
likely to believe that the threat is a bluff. Consequently, targets are more likely  to 
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reciprocate when challenged by adversaries with greater economic dependence. How 
target states respond to threats issued by challengers then becomes an empirical ques-
tion that should be of  interest in understanding the effects of  economic interdepen-
dence and integration on military conflict. I test the following hypotheses12: 
Hypothesis 1A (signaling): As the challenger’s economic dependence, on 
the target, and in general, increases, targets are less likely to reciprocate a 
militarized challenge. 
Hypothesis 1B (opportunity costs): As the challenger’s economic depen-
dence, on the target, and in general, increases, targets are more likely to re-
ciprocate a militarized challenge. 
Challengers’ economic dependence, on the target, and in general, is not limited 
to bilateral trade. A monadic exposure to trade, FDI, or foreign indirect investment 
is also related to Hypotheses 1A and 1B. Several studies find supporting evidence. 
Glick and Taylor (2010) find the persistent negative impact of  war on multilateral 
trade as well as on bilateral trade using data from 1870 to 1997.13 Bussmann (2010) 
reports that fatal disputes reduce FDI inflows, outflows, and stock, while Schneider 
and Troeger (2006) show, based on daily stock market data, that militarized conflicts 
negatively affect transactions in the core financial markets. 
Note that instead of  looking at challengers’ attributes, focusing on targets or dy-
ad’s attributes is not helpful for testing the two explanations. Both arguments pre-
dict that targets that are dependent on the global economy or bilateral trade with 
their challengers will be more constrained from using force, thereby less likely to 
reciprocate. In a similar vein, disputes in more economically integrated or global-
ized dyads are expected to be less likely to escalate, either because both states more 
clearly understand about each other’s intention and resolve or because both states 
find waging war very costly. 
To explore whether the pacifying effects of  trade and FDI holds up at the stage of  
dispute initiation, I examine the effect of  those variables on the probability of  conflict 
initiation. As emphasized, both theories expect that a challenger’s dependence on bi-
lateral trade reduces the likelihood that the challenger will initiate a dispute against its 
trading partner. This implication holds true for monadic openness to trade and FDI 
inflows (Gartzke and Li 2003; Souva and Prins 2006). Accordingly, I derive the fol-
lowing hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (both): As a state’s bilateral trade, total trade, or FDI depen-
dence increases, a state is less likely to initiate an MID. 
Research Design 
I test the hypotheses above using a directed-dyad year data set for 1950–2001. The 
directed-dyad year as a unit of  analysis allows me to identify the initiator and target 
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of  a dispute. Data for military conflict are taken from the Correlates of  War (COW)
MID data set (version 3.1; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). MIDs are defined as situ-
ations ‘‘in which the threat, display or use of  military force short of  war by one mem-
ber state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official 
forces, property, or territory of  another state’’ (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 168). 
The data set includes 1,498MIDs14 during the sample period, but the estimation sam-
ple includes 851 to 1,418 MIDs due to the availability of  economic variables.15 
Dependent Variable. To test Hypotheses 1A and 1B, RECIPROCATION is coded 
1 when the target state responded with a threat, display, or use of  force, and 0 when 
it took no militarized action, as in previous studies (Schultz 1999; Prins 2003; Weeks 
2008). As Schultz (1999) explains, a lack of  reciprocation suggests that the target did 
not find military escalation of  the conflict to be worthwhile. The other dependent 
variable is the initiation of  a military conflict during a given year. Previous literature 
considers two types of  initiations. The first measure, INITIATION, is coded 1 if  the 
potential initiator threatened, displayed, or used force in a given year, and 0 other-
wise. The second measure, REVISION-INITIATION, is coded 1 if  a state wanted to 
change the status quo and entered into a militarized dispute. 
Key Independent Variables. The covariates of  main interest are the degree of  
economic interdependence and integration. To measure economic interdependence, 
BI.TRADE DEP.A16 is defined as the volume of  bilateral trade (the sum of  its ex-
ports and imports) as a proportion of  gross domestic product (GDP) to capture the 
importance of  bilateral trade to a challenger’s economy.17 To measure the degree of  
economic integration, I use three covariates. First, I define TOT.TRADE DEP.A as 
the ratio of  total trade (excluding bilateral trade flows) over GDP. Another measure 
for economic integration is annual FDI inflows, which is the sum of  the year’s new 
direct investment in a given host country by foreign direct investors (net of  direct in-
vestments withdrawn by foreign direct investors), calculated as a percentage of  GDP 
(FDI DEP.A). FDI data, available since 1970, are from the online version of  United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)’s Handbook of  Statistics 
(2009). The last variable is an initiator’s degree of  openness in capital account trans-
actions, FINANCIAL OPEN.A. For this variable, I rely on Chinn and Ito (2008) who 
created an index based on the annual report by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions to measure the extensity 
of  capital controls. The IMF only reports data on member countries and thus, in-
cluding FINANCIAL OPEN.A considerably reduces the sample size. For the miss-
ing values, I follow the IMF practice of  replacing missing values with a zero, used in 
Gartzke and Hewitt (2010). The justification of  this practice is that missing data tend 
to be from poorly integrated states. However, I also report the estimation results with 
missing values of  FINANCIAL OPEN.A in the Supplementary Appendix. All eco-
nomic variables are lagged one year behind the dependent variable to control for pos-
sible simultaneous bias.  
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Control Variables. I include a set of  control variables culled from existing re-
search. The democratic peace literature emphasizes the importance of  controlling for 
political regimes in explaining conflict behavior. Following the standard method, I 
code DEMOCRACY A 1 if  the combined Polity score (a state’s democracy score mi-
nus its autocracy score) in a previous year from the Polity IV data (Jaggers and Gurr 
1995) is greater than 6, and otherwise, I code them 0. Second, the balance of  mili-
tary capabilities within a dyad is one important determinant of  military conflicts. To 
control for the balance of  power, I include CAPABILITY RATIO A, the proportion 
of  the capabilities within each crisis dyad that was controlled by the initiator, using 
the COW capabilities score (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Third, dispute initia-
tion is known to be more likely in contiguous dyads and major power dyads. Dummy 
variables, MAJOR POWER A and MAJOR POWER B, are created to indicate ma-
jor powers (China, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics). To control for proximity, the natural logarithm of  the dis-
tance between capital cities, ln (DISTANCE), and an indicator of  contiguity, CON-
TIGUITY, is controlled. CONTIGUITY indicates whether two states share a land 
boundary or are separated by less than 400 miles of  water. Last, it is necessary to in-
clude military alliances, since the liberal peace might be just a by-product of  military 
alliances. ALLIANCE is a binary variable for the presence of  a defense pact, neutral-
ity agreement, or entente in the year prior to the onset of  the dispute, based on the 
COW Alliance Dataset (Gibler 2004). A measure of  alliance portfolio similarity, AL-
LIANCE SIMILARITY, using the Signorino and Ritter ‘‘S’’ score, is also included. 
The variable, modified to range from 0 to 1, measures the satisfaction of  both states 
in the dyad (Signorino 1999). These control variables are included in both the selec-
tion and the outcome equations. 
As Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) emphasize, the probability of  dyadic conflict in 
a given year is likely to be dependent on the conflict history of  that dyad. Specifically, 
the risk of  a conflict is known to decrease as the amount of  time since the last conflict 
increases. This implies that assuming a constant hazard leads to biased estimation re-
sults. I correct for temporal dependence by including years passed since the last MID 
between a dyad and three cubic splines in the initiation equation. The reciprocation 
equation additionally includes four indicator variables for the particular issue at stake 
in the dispute (TERRITORY, REGIME/GOV., POLICY, and OTHERS), following 
the previous research (Horowitz 2009; Schultz 1999; Weeks 2008). Some issues, such 
as territorial control, are often valued more than simple policy changes (Horowitz 
2009). The baseline category for comparison is the case with no specific revision iden-
tified. The data for the issue at stake in the dispute are from Ghosn, Palmer, and 
Bremer (2004). 
Estimation Method. Hypotheses 1A and 1B make predictions regarding reciproca-
tion conditional on a state having chosen to challenge a target. A separate analysis of  
reciprocation may be subject to potential selection bias, since states strategically select 
themselves in and out of  militarized disputes. Reed (2000) persuasively argues  that the 
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onset of  international conflict is endogenously related to the escalation of  conflicts to 
war and that a failure to model the selection of  states into conflict onset leads to bi-
ased inferences about the likelihood of  conflict escalation. Reciprocation is a part of  
conflict escalation and the selection process might have to be controlled. To address 
this concern, I estimate the two-stage Heckman selection model. However, I am aware 
that the estimation of  the selection model depends upon the exclusion restriction—
the existence of  at least one variable that is related to the selection equation but is also 
unrelated to the outcome equation (counter of  years since the last MID between a 
dyad and cubic splines). These time variables may not satisfy the exclusion restriction 
since all factors that influence dispute escalation would also influence dispute escala-
tion initiation. Therefore, it would be difficult to correctly specify the selection equa-
tion due to the exclusion restriction necessary to identify the two-stage probit model. 
A poorly specified selection equation can yield biased estimates, both in selection and 
in outcome equations, leading to incorrect inferences about hypothesis tests for selec-
tion (Brandt and Schneider 2007; Freedman and Sekhon 2010). This is the reason that, 
consistent with the recommendation of  Brandt and Schneider (2007), I also estimate 
separate probit models for MID reciprocation to ensure the robustness of  the result. In 
the latter case, the data set consists of  only directed dyads having experienced MIDs at 
some point. The dispute data set, dropping all ongoing conflicts, includes 1,485 MIDs 
during the period under investigation. 18 Standard errors are clustered at the dyad level 
in a selection model (or at the dispute level in a probit model) to address potential 
problems of  heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the error terms. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the results of  two-stage selection models comprising the selection 
and outcome equations. The dependent variable of  the selection equation is INITIA-
TION, while the dependent variable of  the outcome equation is RECIPROCATION. 
Models 1 through 4 each include one lagged economic variable, and model 5 controls 
for all of  them. The likelihood ratio test for the independence of  the two equations (r 
¼ 0) rejects the null hypothesis of  the independence (p ¼ .001). Consistent with Reed 
(2000), this indicates that the two stages, MID initiation and reciprocation, are linked 
and that we need to account for the selection process to examine the effect of  eco-
nomic interdependence and globalization on reciprocation. 
Table 1 shows that all liberal economic variables of  main interest—BI. TRADE 
DEP.A, TOT. TRADE DEP.A, FDI DEP.A, and FINANCIAL OPEN.A—are neg-
atively associated with the likelihood of  reciprocation.19 This result bears out the sig-
naling rather than the opportunity cost argument, indicating that targets are less likely 
to resist challengers who has a greater degree of  economic interdependence or expo-
sure to the global economy. However, only the estimated coefficient on BI.TRADE 
DEP.A is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. BI.TRADE DEP.A remains 
negative and significant even when all other economic variables are added to the 
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Table 1. Selection Models of Reciprocation
     Model 1     Model 2      Model 3      Model 4      Model 5
Reciprocation
Bi. Trade Dep. A  –0.648*   –0.590*
 (0.343)     (0.308)
Tot. Trade Dep.A   –0.015    0.010
  (0.016)    (0.019)
FDI Dep. A    –0.015   –0.016
   (0.027)   (0.026)
Financial Open. A     –0.027  –0.029
    (0.040)  (0.047)
Democracy A  –0.025  –0.026  0.033  –0.039  0.063
 (0.102)  (0.100)  (0.137)  (0.133)  (0.147)
Democracy B  –0.055  –0.086  0.035  –0.017  0.049
 (0.093)  (0.092)  (0.114)  (0.108)  (0.119)
Capability Ratio  –0.164 –0.140  –0.184  –0.211  –0.234
 (0.148) (0.146)  (0.184)  (0.168)  (0.189)
Major–Minor  0.118  0.092  0.103  0.141  0.189
 (0.134)  (0.135)  (0.190)  (0.159)  (0.189)
Minor–Major  0.092  0.032  0.126  0.064  0.246
 (0.176)  (0.168)  (0.222)  (0.192)  (0.238)
Major–Major  –0.467**  –0.508**  –0.469*  –0.574***  –0.369
 (0.198)  (0.200)  (0.257)  (0.220)  (0.256)
Alliance  0.064  0.054  0.005  0.012  0.025
 (0.101)  (0.101)  (0.122)  (0.109)  (0.126)
Alliance 0.225  0.211  0.669***  0.308  0.646***
Similarity (0.150)  (0.150)  (0.214)  (0.189)  (0.220)
ln(distance)  –0.039*  –0.037  –0.027  –0.023  –0.032
 (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.031)
Contiguity  –0.310*  –0.323*  –0.130  –0.066  –0.058
 (0.181)  (0.181)  (0.220)  (0.195)  (0.220)
Territory  0.043  0.045  0.018  0.114  0.048
 (0.109)  (0.108)  (0.146)  (0.133)  (0.150)
Policy  –0.774***  –0.775***  –0.711***  –0.668***  –0.691***
 (0.101)  (0.100)  (0.129)  (0.113)  (0.133)
Regime/ –0.002  0.018  –0.386  –0.106  –0.368
    government (0.168)  (0.169)  (0.249)  (0.201)  (0.270)
Other issues  –0.700***  –0.696***  –0.734***  –0.656***  –0.718***
 (0.192)  (0.191)  (0.228)  (0.202)  (0.232)
Constant  1.537***  1.590***  0.948***  1.132***  0.746*
 (0.312)  (0.310)  (0.409)  (0.374)  (0.409)
Initiation
    Bi. Trade Dep. A  –0.023     –0.045
 (0.083)     (0.082)
   Tot. Trade Dep.A   0.007    –0.003
  (0.005)   (0.007)
(continued)
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regression. I interpret these findings as evidence that challengers with a greater degree 
of  bilateral dependence on targets are more able to issue credible threats. 
Turning to the initiation equation at the bottom of  Table 1, I examine the impact 
of  economic variables on dispute initiation. If  either theory of  the liberal peace is 
valid at the stage of  dispute initiation, we should expect that a greater level of  eco-
nomic interdependence or globalization will be associated with a lower probability 
Table 1. (continued)
     Model 1     Model 2      Model 3      Model 4      Model 5
FDI Dep. A    –0.014*   –0.010
   (0.008)   (0.009)
Financial Open. A     –0.043***  –0.037***
    (0.014)  (0.013)
Democracy A  –0.162***  –0.169***  –0.189***  –0.183***  –0.148***
 (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.036)  (0.039)
Democracy B  0.081**  0.079**  –0.026  –0.048  0.030
 (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.039)
Capability Ratio  0.247***  0.252***  0.284***  0.270***  0.287***
 (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.047)  (0.053)
Major–Minor  0.365***  0.369***  0.337***  0.330***  0.356***
 (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.070)  (0.060)  (0.068)
Minor–Major  0.511***  0.511***  0.499***  0.483***  0.490***
 (0.068)  (0.067)  (0.072)  (0.067)  (0.071)
Major–Major  1.031***  1.036***  0.947***  0.929***  0.929***
 (0.156)  (0.156)  (0.186)  (0.160)  (0.190)
Alliance  –0.055  –0.055  0.087  0.084  0.090*
 (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.054)
Alliance –0.356***  –0.362***  –0.602***  –0.584***  –0.591***
Similarity (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.074)  (0.065)  (0.073)
 ln(distance)  –0.071***  –0.071***  –0.085***  –0.080***  –0.081***
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.015)
Contiguity  0.996***  0.994***  0.860***  0.901***  0.864***
 (0.111)  (0.110)  (0.122)  (0.111)  (0.121)
Peace Years  –0.166***  –0.166***  –0.148***  –0.140***  –0.173***
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.013)
Constant  –1.909***  –1.913***  –1.536***  –1.679***  –1.494***
 (0.126) (0.126)  (0.152)  (0.140)  (0.152)
ρ –0.407***  –0.421***  –0.406***  –0.388***  –0.351***
Number of 907,454  907,454  637,146  796,649  626,911
   observations
Uncensored 1,418  1,418  856  1,095  851
   observations
FDI = foreign direct investment. Standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.  
Cubic splines included but not reported. All economic variables are lagged.
* p < .10 ;  ** p < .05 ; *** p < .01
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of  dispute initiation. Table 1 shows that the effects of  all economic variables except 
total trade dependence are in the expected directions. Consistent with Gartzke and 
Li (2003) and Gartzke (2007), FINANCIAL OPEN.A is statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level and negative. FDI DEP.A is significant only when estimated with-
out other economic variables. On the other hand, BI.TRADE DEP.A comes nowhere 
near conventional levels of  statistical significance. Like Gelpi and Grieco (2008), I 
include interaction variables between economic variables and DEMOCRACY A 
to examine the contingent effect of  economic variables. There is no significant evi-
dence that the effects of  economic variables differ according to the political regimes 
(reported in Supplementary Appendix). Regardless of  political regimes, BI.TRADE 
DEP.A is not significant. This result is different from Gelpi and Grieco’s (2008) find-
ing that the effect of  trade on conflict initiation is contingent on democratic politi-
cal institutions. One possible reason for this difference is that they use the continuous 
Polity IV democracy indicator to measure political regimes and investigate only the 
years from 1950 to 1992. 
I employ an alternative estimator to check the robustness of  the previous finding. 
20 To ensure against the possibility of  a poorly misspecified selection equation, mod-
els 1 and 2 in Table 2 report the estimation results of  probit models in which the 
dependent variable is RECIPROCATION and the sample is dispute-dyads. Here I 
dropped all ongoing conflicts, making the number of  MIDs 1,485. However, the es-
timation results remain robust to the inclusion of  all dispute-dyads experiencing on-
going conflicts (see the Supplementary Appendix). The result is very similar to Ta-
ble 1, although the coefficient estimate on BI.TRADE DEP.A is slightly smaller in 
magnitude compared to those in the selection model. Coefficient estimates on other 
economic variables of  interest remain negative but not significant (reported in the 
Supplementary Appendix). Only BI.TRADE DEP.A is negatively and significantly 
associated with the probability of  reciprocation. 
To understand the magnitude of  the substantive effect, Figure 1A illustrates the ef-
fect of  challengers’ bilateral trade on the predicted probability of  dispute reciproca-
tion computed from model 1 in Table 2.21 I use the probit model for substantive inter-
pretations. The solid lines refer to the point estimates of  the predicted probabilities of  
reciprocation, and the dotted lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. The pre-
dicted probability of  reciprocation drops from 0.48 to 0.39 as the level of  BI.TRADE 
DEP.A jumps from 0 (the first percentile) to 0.4 percent (approximately the 99th per-
centile). To understand the magnitude of  the effect better, I calculate the effect of  a 
regime change in a challenger on the probability of  reciprocation. A change from au-
tocracy to democracy is estimated to reduce the probability of  reciprocation by 0.056. 
This implies that the estimated effect of  bilateral trade on the reciprocated conflict is 
not ignorable. 
Next, I employ REVISION-INITIATION as a measure of  dispute initiation. To 
recall, the initiator of  a dispute is defined as the first state to threaten or to use mili-
tary force. This definition does not account for whether a state publicly demanded to 
revise the status quo. The reaction toward conflict initiation with revisionist aims may 
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Table 2. Probit Regression of Reciprocation.
     All Initiations                             Revision-Initiations
    Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4     Model 5   Model 6
Bi. Trade Dep. A  -0.474*  -0.547*  -0.996**  -0.924**  -0.654*  -0.864**
 (0.279)  (0.304)  (0.438)  (0.439)  (0.336)  (0.425)
Tot. Trade Dep. A   0.016   0.013   0.020
  (0.022)   (0.021)   (0.023)
FDI Dep. A   -0.036   -0.026   -0.040
  (0.031)   (0.031)   (0.035)
Financial Open. A   -0.044   -0.063   -0.072
  (0.052)   (0.053)   (0.060)
Democracy A  -0.112  -0.084  0.187  0.259*  -0.052  0.094
 (0.097)  (0.133)  (0.127)  (0.140)  (0.112)  (0.150)
Democracy B  -0.123  -0.127  -0.043  -0.060  -0.134  -0.217*
 (0.089)  (0.118)  (0.114)  (0.117)  (0.100)  (0.130)
Capability Ratio  -0.055  -0.073  -0.278  -0.329  -0.026  -0.173
 (0.150)  (0.191)  (0.202)  (0.204)  (0.170)  (0.211)
Major–Minor  0.213  0.278  0.106  0.198  0.167  0.323
 (0.132)  (0.215)  (0.200)  (0.205)  (0.147)  (0.224)
Minor–Major  0.159  0.347  0.496**  0.487**  0.359**  0.542**
 (0.155)  (0.216)  (0.246)  (0.246)  (0.176)  (0.240)
Major–Major  -0.069  -0.088  -0.172  -0.131  0.095  0.105
 (0.203)  (0.333)  (0.374)  (0.375)  (0.227)  (0.361)
Alliance  -0.042  0.065  0.019  0.043  -0.079  0.028
 (0.099)  (0.126)  (0.127)  (0.129)  (0.111)  (0.139)
Alliance Similarity  0.080  0.322  0.596***  0.598***  0.048  0.316
 (0.143)  (0.231)  (0.230)  (0.231)  (0.164)  (0.250)
ln(distance)  -0.051***  -0.040*  -0.050  -0.047  -0.063***  -0.051*
 (0.017)  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.019)  (0.027)
Contiguity  0.235*  0.378**  -0.046  -0.059  0.226  0.353*
 (0.133)  (0.183)  (0.231)  (0.231)  (0.153)  (0.203)
Territory  0.148  0.130  0.751***  0.778***  0.835***  0.813***
 (0.116)  (0.162)  (0.223)  (0.223)  (0.205)  (0.231)
Policy  -0.742***  -0.593***  0.034  0.044  -0.040  0.106
 (0.105)  (0.149)  (0.213)  (0.213)  (0.201)  (0.227)
Regime/ 0.060  -0.409  0.374  0.347  0.772***  0.283
    government  (0.186)  (0.262)  (0.307)  (0.312)  (0.253)  (0.311)
Other issues  -0.693***  -0.682***
 (0.206)  (0.242)
Constant  0.226  -0.262  0.128  0.079  -0.437          -0.886**
 (0.210)  (0.319)  (0.478)  (0.484)  (0.298)  (0.392)
Observations  1,414  849  626,911  626,911  1,130  715
Models 3 and 4 present the Heckman selection estimates and other models report the binary probit 
estimates. Standard errors clustered by dyad in selection models (3 and 4) or by dispute (in other probit 
models). Selection equations in models 3 and 4 not reported.
* p < .10 ;  ** p < .05 ;  *** p < .01
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be different from   the reaction toward initiation in their absence. Consequently, I es-
timate the same models on samples where the initiator publicly made a revisionist de-
mand.22 This modification reduces the number of  MID dyads from 1,485 to 1,187 
during the sample period. Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 report the estimates of  the se-
lection models, while models 5 and 6 present those of  the probit models. The coef-
ficient estimates on BI.TRADE DEP.A increase in magnitude and statistical signif-
icance (see also Figure 1b). They are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.23 
I also examine whether the previous finding varies across different subsets of  the 
data. Some previous research (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1999) 
uses politically relevant dyads that are contiguous dyads and/or dyads in which at 
least one of  the states is a major power (Lemke and Reed 2001). Since these dyads 
have more opportunities to interact with each other, researchers expect them to be 
more likely to engage in militarized disputes. Politically relevant dyads comprise 9.5 
percent of  all dyad-years but account for 85 percent of  all MIDs in the sample. Fur-
thermore, Vasquez (1995) and Reed and Chiba (2010) argue that neighboring states 
respond differently than do nonneighboring states to the same ex ante observable 
variables. This behavioral difference explains to a great degree why conflict probabil-
ity differs between contiguous and noncontiguous dyads. Conflicts among contiguous 
dyads account for 70 percent of  all MIDs. Therefore, it is useful to check how eco-
nomic interdependence or globalization operate among neighboring or politically rel-
evant dyads. 
I estimate model 1 in Table 2 on four different sub samples: politically relevant, con-
tiguous, nonrelevant, and noncontiguous dyads. To conserve space, I report only the 
estimated effects of  BI.TRADE DEP.A whose coefficient is statistically significant. 
Figure 1. Bilateral trade dependence and predicted probability of reciprocation. Each graph plots 
the predicted probability of reciprocation and 95 percent confidence intervals as BI.TRADE 
DEP.A increases. Estimates are computed from models 1 and 5 in Table 2 using the CLARIFY pro-
gram (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, 2000). Continuous (discrete) variables are set to their means 
(medians).  
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Figure 2 illustrates how the previous estimates vary according to the choice of  sam-
ple. The black dots refer to the point estimates of  the change in probability due to a 
one standard deviation change in the economic variables, holding other continuous 
(discrete) variables constant at their mean (medians). The lines around the dots show 
95 percent confidence interval.24 The negative effects of  Bi.Trade Dep.A on the likeli-
hood of  reciprocation are found in samples comprising major power or contiguous dy-
ads. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Reed and Chiba 2010), they are the most 
pronounced among contiguous dyads. This finding seems to indicate that the informa-
tive effect of  economic interdependence and globalization is limited to interactive dy-
ads in which states pay closer attention to each other. Restricting analysis only to initia-
tors that publicly made the revisionist claim does not significantly alter the results. The 
estimation results are presented in white dots and their corresponding lines in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Predicted probability of reciprocation for different subsets of data. This figure illustrates 
the differences in the predicted probability of dispute reciprocation when increasing BI.TRADE 
DEP.A from its mean by one standard deviation, holding other variables constant at their means or 
medians. Dots refer to the point estimates of the first difference, and horizontal lines associated 
with dots are 95 percent confidence intervals. Estimates are computed from models 1 and 5 in Ta-
ble 2 using the CLARIFY program (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, 2000). White dots indicate the ef-
fects when the initiator publicly wanted to change the status quo, while black dots refers to those 
without imposing any restriction on militarized interstate dispute initiation.
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Figure 3. Predicted probability of initiation for different subsets of data. This figure illustrates the 
differences in the predicted probability of dispute initiation when changing economic variables from 
its mean by one standard deviation, holding other variables constant at their means or medians. 
Dots refer to the point estimates of the first difference and horizontal lines associated with dots 
are 90 percent confidence intervals. Estimates are computed from models 3 and 4 in Table A12 of 
the Supplementary Appendix.  
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 I also repeat the same exercise for conflict initiation. Figure 3 displays the point 
estimates of  first differences and their confidence intervals across different samples. 
A clear pattern stands out among three graphs. The deterrent effect of  the liberal eco-
nomic variables is much greater for contiguous dyads than for noncontiguous ones. 
As mentioned above, the effect of  BI.TRADE DEP.A is not significant across differ-
ent samples.25 
Last, I check the robustness of  the results against the impact of  outliers. For in-
stance, some countries, such as the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, en-
gage in militarized disputes much more frequently than others do (Weeks 2008). To 
ensure that empirical results are not driven by any particular country, I perform a jack-
knife analysis. Specifically, I reestimate model 4 in Table 2 by excluding one initiator 
in each run, resulting in estimating 139 regressions. Point estimates on BI.TRADE 
DEP.A always remain negative and similar (-0.36 to -0.60). Approximately, 95 per-
cent of  the estimated coefficients are found within approximately a 10 percent range 
(-0.41 to -0.52) of  the coefficient estimate (-0.47) computed based on the full set of  dy-
ads in model 1 of  Table 2. This finding indicates that the main result consistent with 
the signaling argument is not driven by individual states. 
Conclusion 
An increasing number of  studies have found that greater economic interdepen-
dence or globalization, particularly bilateral trade, is associated with a decreased 
probability of  MID. The opportunity cost argument suggests that interstate com-
merce discourages states from fighting by increasing the cost of  fighting. The signal-
ing argument emphasizes that economic interdependence and integration allow states 
to more credibly reveal their intentions and resolve, thereby reducing uncertainty and 
the likelihood of  conflict. I contend that the failure to conduct a test to discriminate 
the two perspectives is one of  the reasons for our inability to adjudicate alternative 
explanations. Most studies have examined the onset of  militarized disputes. This is 
not helpful in differentiating the two arguments since both of  them identically predict 
the pacifying effect of  economic interdependence or integration. 
I employ the information theory of  war to seek the different empirical implica-
tions of  the two arguments. Under the incomplete information assumption, both 
the opportunity costs of  fighting and the costly signaling can reduce the equilib-
rium probability of  war. However, I can derive different predictions regarding how 
states behave in dispute situations by drawing on the existing literature on demo-
cratic peace and audience costs. If  the signaling argument is correct, a threat from 
a more economically integrated or interdependent challenger is more credible since 
that challenger can more effectively convey information. Therefore, the target is less 
likely to reciprocate. To the contrary, should the opportunity cost argument hold 
true, challengers more dependent on bilateral trade with the target or more exposed 
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to the global economy are more constrained from using force. The target is aware 
of  this fact and  thus, the challengers’ threats are less credible. This leads the target 
to be more likely to resist the challenge. These different predictions about the crisis 
behavior of  target states can shed light on how economic interdependence and in-
tegration influence states’ behavior in a crisis, helping us adjudicate the competing 
explanations. 
To measure economic linkages, this article utilizes not only bilateral trade but also 
total trade, government financial openness, and FDI inflows. The estimation of  the 
selection models suggests that target states are less likely to reciprocate as challengers’ 
bilateral trade increases. This is consistent with the signaling argument rather than 
with the opportunity cost argument. Next, both theories argue that economic interde-
pendence and globalization reduce the probability of  conflict initiation. Only govern-
ment financial openness and FDI dependence, intended to capture the degree of  eco-
nomic integration, are significantly associated with a decreased probability of  conflict 
initiation. However, there is no significant evidence for a deterrent effect of  bilateral 
trade dependence on dispute initiation. If  bilateral trade contributes to peace, it will 
be through the effect on the probability of  reciprocation. 
To extend this line of  research, I will investigate how economic interdependence 
and integration influence the outcome of  crisis bargaining in the future (e.g., Gelpi 
and Griesdorf  2001; Beardsley and Asal 2009). If  the opportunity cost argument is 
accurate, initiators exposed to the global economy or dependent on bilateral trade are 
less likely to prevail or gain concessions in a crisis than are those isolated from the 
global economy. These challengers will face greater costs of  fighting and, therefore, 
will prefer peaceful outcomes. The signaling argument suggests that more globalized 
initiators are more likely to prevail than other types of  initiators. This is because their 
escalatory moves will hurt themselves and their threats will be considered more cred-
ible. Accordingly, challengers exposed to the global economy should be able to coerce 
opponents into backing down. Additional results supportive of  the signaling argu-
ment will merit stronger confidence in the signaling argument. 
Replication data and Supplementary Appendix can be downloaded from the Journal of  Con-
flict Resolution archive at http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/58/5/894/suppl/DC1 This supple-
mentary (.zip) file is also available from the html cover page for this article in the UNL Digi-
talCommons repository. 
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Notes 
1. For instance, several studies focus on economic development to explain the capitalist peace. 
Mousseau (2003) emphasizes the role of  market-oriented economic development in creating 
peaceful preferences. He argues the contingent effect of  the democratic peace according to 
the level of  economic development. In a similar spirit, Gartzke (2007) suggests that develop-
ment discourages states from engaging in conquest, while it increases the ability to project 
power, leading to more fights over policy goals. Last, McDonald (2009) argues that the rela-
tive dominance of  private ownership in a domestic economy and competitive market struc-
tures has promoted peace between states. 
2. It is well known that war occurs under incomplete information due to the so-called risk-re-
turn trade-off  (Fearon 1995; Powell 1999). 
3. It is worthwhile to note that the opportunity cost argument is silent on the escalation of  a 
militarized dispute. Even Polachek and Xiang (2010), who analyze the opportunity cost ar-
gument in the incomplete information game, address only the equilibrium probability of  
war. How opportunity costs affect states’ crisis behavior is rarely discussed. I employ the in-
complete information assumption and derive the implication about targets’ reciprocation 
from the opportunity cost argument. 
4. I interchangeably use the terms foreign direct investment (FDI) dependence and FDI open-
ness throughout this article. 
5. One exception is Polachek and Xiang (2010). They consider the strategic interaction to ex-
plain the role of  opportunity costs in conflicts and show that opportunity cost can reduce 
the likelihood of  military conflict in the incomplete information game. 
6. Due to the space limitation, I discuss only the informational problem. 
7. Uncertainty not only about resolve but also about power is an important determinant of  
war. Then uncertainty about the distribution of  power, not the distribution of  power itself, 
causes conflict (Reed 2003b). 
8. It is worth noting that both sets of  arguments rely on the opportunity costs for waging war. 
The willingness to pay the opportunity costs increases the credibility of  a threat to use force. 
Therefore, a key assumption behind both arguments is that trade and foreign investment re-
act adversely to military conflict. Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares (1998) and Morrow (1999) 
argue that if  economic agents predict conflict and reduce their economic transaction in ad-
vance, the actual onset of  a militarized dispute would not decrease trade. Economic actors 
would not have perfect information about political relations among states. To the degree 
traders’ information is imperfect, conflict should often shrink trade (Hegre, Oneal, and Rus-
sett 2010). 
9. One exception is Reed (2003a). With a Bayesian heteroskedastic probit model, he directly 
tests the informational argument that uncertainty increases as states trade less, leading to  a 
higher probability of  militarized interstate dispute (MID) onset. However, this method does 
not test the signaling argument against the opportunity cost argument. 
10. For studies with different findings, see Barbieri (2002) and Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny 
(2004). Contrary to Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny (2004), however, Hegre, Oneal, and Rus-
sett (2010) find a pacifying effect of  trade using a simultaneous estimator. Additionally, in-
creasing evidence has shown the pacifying effect of  trade. 
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11. Souva and Prins (2006) analyze the effect of  trade and FDI dependence on fatal MID initi-
ation at the monadic level. 
12. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these succinct hypotheses. 
13. To the contrary, Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) find little evidence for the negative ef-
fect on trade with neutral countries, although they find that military conflicts have a large 
and persistent effect on future bilateral trade between ten and twenty years. 
14. I restrict the analysis only to originators to a dispute by dropping latecomers and joiners, 
and do not include dyad-years with an ongoing dispute unless there is a new initiation in a 
given year. Last, when multiple MIDs occur in a year, I use data from the highest intensity 
MIDs. 
15. Data for all variables, except economic variables, are generated using the EUGene soft-
ware, version 3:204 (Bennett and Stam 2000). 
16. A denotes the challenger, while B refers to the target. 
17. I average the directed trade flows, where directed trade equals imports plus exports since 
the sum of  A’s exports to and imports from B is not equal to the sum of  B’s exports to and 
imports from A (Gleditsch 2002, 715). 
18. The previous full data set including all directed dyads includes only one observation per 
year, while the dispute data set includes multiple MIDs per year. This is the reason that the 
two data sets have different numbers of  MIDs. 
19. The only exception is TOT. TRADE DEP.A when controlled for other economic variables. 
20. Supplementary Appendix includes the results of  several additional estimations. 
21. The estimates are calculated using CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). 
22. In this case, the reference category is Others. It is dropped from estimation. 
23. See the Supplementary Appendix for additional analysis of  other economic covarates. 
24. Accordingly, the first difference for all dyads estimated on INITIATION (the uppermost 
black dot and lines) is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Likewise, the first dif-
ference for contiguous dyads estimated on REVISION-INITIATION is also statistically sig-
nificant only at the 10 percent level. 
25. The effect of  FDI dependence on all dyads is significant at the 10 percent level. However, 
the effect was so small compared to that in contiguous dyad that it cannot be precisely de-
picted in the figure. 
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